Abstract
Introduction
The best way to organize the IS functions within a firm is an IS management issue that has been cited as critical for IS executives since the mid-1980s (e.g., Brancheau and Wetherbe, 1987; Dixon and John, 1989; Niederman, et al., 1991) . In fact, recent surveys from four continents identify the alignment of the IS organization within an enterprise as a key IS issue (Watson and Brancheau, 1991) . Although some models that could lead to a better understanding of this alignment issue have been proposed by MIS researchers (e.g., Allen and Boynton, 1991; Zmud, et al., 1986) , to date, there is an absence of theoretical or empirically based guidelines from the academic community.
A scanning of the trade press reveals an array of articles that discuss the IS alignment problem, with titles that herald centralized, decentralized, and "centrally decentralized" solutions (e.g., Alter, 1990; Maglitta and Mehler, 1992; Von Simson, 1990 ). However, titles that portray the IS design choice as a centralization vs. decentralization dichotomy obscure the fact that many of these articles describe strategies in which some IS functions are centralized, others are decentralized, and still others have responsibilities shared between a central IS unit and the business units (e.g., LaBelle and Nyce, 1987; LaPlante, 1991; Margolis, 1993) . Within the literature thers also appears to be general agreement about the primary organizational tradeoffs: centralization affords greater efficiencies (economies of scale) and standarized controls well as organizational integration, while decentralization provides local control and ownership of resources as well as greater responsiveness to business unit needs (Berger, 1990; Carlyle, 1990c; Gralla, 1988; LaPlante, 1991; Messmer, 1990; Sewell, 1987; Von Simson, 1990; Wetherbe, 1988; Wilder, 1989) .
The purpose of this paper is to increase our knowledge about what centralized, decentralized, or hybrid IS organization designs are being adopted and what patterns of internal and external antecedents are important for explaining these different choices.
Prior Research
The IS literature of the past decade documents two related trsnds in the approach to aligning the IS functions with the enterprise. First, telecommunications management has become an IS responsibility, and both computer and telecommunications operations have become widely regarded as utility functions for which economies of scale and connectivity benefits have been the predominant concerns (e.g., Cash, et al., 1988; Dixon and John, 1989; McNurlin and Sprague, 1989) . Second, opposing choices for the management of technology vs. the management of the use of technology have been documented. That is, firms have moved toward consolidating the management of technology, while decentralizing the management of the use of technology (Allen and Boynton, 1991; Dixonand John, 1989; Zmud, et al., 1986) .
Among the conceptual studies, one of the more interesting contributions has been the notion of an "information economy within a business" (Zmud, et al., 1986) in which information resources are owned and managed by business units as well as a central IS organization. Within the information economy of a firm, a "federal government role" is prescribed for the central IS organization that is responsible for the "transportation architecture" (processors, databases, and networks), while the business units provide information products and services (i.e., plan, build, and run their own application systems). In contrast to other hybrid solutions that often arise in response to firm-specific situations--such as the acquisition of a new company with a wellmanaged data center that is left intact--this federal government role is a very purposeful design with distinct delineation of responsibilities. A highly cited report from the Research Board, Inc. (Von Simson, 1990 ) also subscribes to an design with IS roles played by both a central IS organization and the business units, but here a "centrally decentralized" IS organization, with strong dotted-line ("striped-line") reporting relationships, is prescribed. 1
One consistent thread spanning the literature from the 1980s to the present is the notion of contingency fit. That is, it is assumed that the best way to organize the IS functions within a given firm is contingent upon internal and external factors specific to that firm. Our scanning of published research since 1980 identified the following predictor variables for a firm's IS design solution: industry (Ahituv, et al., 1989; Clark, 1992) , firm size (Ahituv, et al., 1989; Clark, 1992; Ein-Dor and Segev, 1982; Olson and Chervany, 1980; Tavakolian, 1989 ), corporate or business-level strategy (Henderson and Venkatraman, 1992; Tavakolian, 1989) , various structural variables including locus of decision-making authority (Ahituv, et al., 1989; Cash, et al., 1988; Ein-Dor and Segev, 1982; Henderson and Venkatraman, 1992; King, 1983; Olson and Chervany, 1980; Tavakolian, 1989) , and business unit autonomy (King, 1983) . However, empirical support for these proposed relationships is scant. We found only one study that investigated a strategy variable (Tavakolian, 1989) , and mixed support has been reported for both firm size (Ein-Dor and Segev, 1982; Olson and Chervany, 1980; Tavakolian, 1989) and various structural variables (Ahituv, et al., 1989; Ein-Dor and Segev, 1982; Olson and Chervany, 1980; Tavakolian, 1989) . Despite this lack of strong confirmatory evidence, the concept that the best IS structural solution should in some way be contingent on organizaMore specifically, Yon $imson describes a design in which business units determine the level of IS resource funding and project priorities, but the responsibility for IS personnel recruitment, training, and career movement resides with corporate IS. The locus of the human resource management tasks is outside the scope of this paper.
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tional or environmental factors is still firmly subscribed to by prominent IS researchers close to the field (Allen and Boynton, 1991; Elam, et al., 1988) .
Research Question
Our overall research objective is to contribute to the development of a model of antecedents for the alignment of the IS functions with the enterprise. This study was approached from a different perspective because of gaps and inconsistencies in the previous literature. First, we believe that the empirical support for a contingent approach is scant because previous researchers have focused on relationships between single antecedents and a given design for one or more IS functions. Within management studies, contingency theory has also received strong conceptual support, but this literature has also stressed that studies that limit their focus to bivariate relationships can lead to contradictory and bewildering results (Ginsberg, 1988; Hambrick, 1984; Miller and Friesen, 1980) . We feel a more appropriate perspective is to investigate the effects of multiple antecedents simultaneously. More specifically, we propose that a firm's design solution for the IS functions can be better explained by patterns of variables, or "gestalts" (Hambrick, 1984; Harrigan, 1985; Miller, 1986; . Second, the prior published research has essentially ignored IS-specific antecedents. Characteristics of the firm's prior IT investments (e.g., its application portfolio), the IS organization (e.g., budget size), and the level of satisfaction among the IS organization's customers are alluded to in single case studies in the trade press, but remain unexplored in comparative studies (for an exception, see Ein-Dor and Segev, 1982) .
Third, there currently exists a lack of knowledge about the nature of the IS alignment problem. As recently pointed out by Henderson and Venkatraman (1992) , decisions about the locus responsibility for the IS functions can result from different kinds of alignment pressures~ncluding alignment with the firm's overall infrastructure and processes (functional integration) and alignment with an IT strategy (strategic fit). Not only have previous reseachers failed to look at multiple antecedents and their alignment, but they have also failed to identify the specific impact of those antecedents on an IS alignment decision. This study attempts to capture the antecedents for specific IS alignment decisions, which to our knowledge addresses a research question previously unexplored.
More specifically, the core research question for this study is as follows:
What patterns of antecedents best explain different IS organization design decisions?
Based on the recent literature, we assumed that we would find examples of centralized, decentralized, and hybrid designs for the IS functions and that industry type would not be a strong predictor. However, to test these assumptions, our sample included firms paired by industry.
The Methodology section presents our definitions for centralization~decentralization solutions and the IS structure and then describes the research framework, selection of the sample firms, and data collection methods. The antecedents that were investigated are presented in the subsequent section.
Methodology
Given our interest in patterns of antecedents previously not focused on by MIS researchers, the research methodology is primarily an inductive one; but with an initial conceptual framework based on prior literature and an overall theoretical perspective (of gestalts). We also utilized some prestructured instrumentation and a mixture of qualitative and quantitative data analysis (Miles and Huberman, 1984) .
Although the prior MIS research offers little in the way of empirically grounded guidelines, it does offer a starting place for definitions and operationalizations. The most common definitions for centralization~decentralization (C/D) solutions are as follows. In a centralized solution, the IS responsibility is held totally within a centralized or corporate IS unit. In a decentralized solution, the IS responsibility is held totally within business units, resulting in multiple units with IS personnel dispersed throughout a firm. These definitions have been operationalized two ways: as a tripartite C/D choice that includes a mid-range solution in addition to the extremes (Ein-Dor and Segev, 1982; King, 1983; Olson and Chervany, ANgning iT 1980) , or as a continuum of C/D choices (Tavakolian, 1989) . Within the empirical studies that have investigated more than one IS function (e.g., systems operations, systems development, and systems management) the C/D design choices for these functions have also been conceptualized as separate, although not totally independent (Benjamin, et al., 1985; Olson and Chervany, 1980; Tavakolian, 1989) .
In keeping with the prior literature, the C/D terminology is retained, and totally centralized IS functions are defined as those for which the locus of responsibility (decision-making authority) belongs to a central IS unit, while totally decentralized IS functions are defined as those for which the locus of responsibility belongs to a business unit (including an IS unit that reports to a business unit). The C/D choice is viewed as a continuum for each IS function, and each function is measured on a 7-point scale. However, after analyzing the data, we also found it useful to apply tri-partite labels. Ratings of 1-2 are characterized as (highly) centralized; ratings 6-7 as (highly) decentralized. Ratings in the middle of the scale (3-5) are labeled as "shared"; that is, responsibilities for the function are shared between a corporate (central) IS unit and the business units.
This study also expands on the set of three traditional IS functions utilized in earlier empirical studies (Olson and Chervany, 1980; Tavakolian, 1989) in order to address the fuller range of related tasks that has emerged over the past decade (Benjamin, et al., 1985; Cash, et al., 1988; McNurlin and Sprague, 1989; Zmud, 1984) . Further, these IS functions are classified under the two groupings suggested by Dixon and John (1989) For the remainder of this paper, the term IS structure denotes a firm's total set of C/D solutions for the above IS functions.
'The term hybrid is also used for a very specific type of IS structure. A hybrid IS structure refers to a design in which the locus of responsibility for the management of technology functions is highly centralized, but the locus of responsibility for the management of the use of technology is highly decentralized, such as in Zmud, et al.'s, (1986) , federal government model.
The steps followed in this research project match well a framework proposed for theory-building from case study research (Eisenhardt, 1989) . First, an initial conceptual framework was developed (see Figure 1) . The initial selection antecedent variables was guided not only by prior contingency studies, but also gestalt theory. Gestalt theory states that elements external and internal to the firm form critical interfaces that must be coaligned for the organization to be effective (Miller, 1986; . We therefore embarked on this study under the strong assumption that a number of factors--both in the external environment and within the boundaries of the organization-must be in alignment if a firm is to perform optimally. 2
The initial framework in Figure 1 helped to determine the choices of multiple research sites and data collection approaches. One of our key concerns was the selection of a small number of case sites that would be a theoretically useful sample. First, size and threshold effects caused us to choose only Fortune 500-size firms. 3 Second, in order to test our assumption that industry type alone would not explain differences in IS structure, pairs of for-profit firms in identical or very similar industries were selected. Third, both manufacturing and service firms were included, all with a decentralized line-of-business structure, sometimes with strategic business unit groupings. Fourth, only firms that primarily perform the above management of technology and management of the use of technology tasks with inter-2 This approach would appear to be supported by the statement in Summer, at al. (1990) that "the central cause of the survival and growth of the organization is its 'aJignment' " (p. 36~). 3 Just as for overall organization size, we assumed a threshold potential for IS organization size. Cash, et al. (1988) suggest a "sizable staff" is needed in order to keep IT specialists, to allow the pursuit of complex tasks without undue risk, and to provide technical and business-oriented career paths. However, the utilization of experts from a corporate staff or outside contractor, and/or heavy reliance on purchased packages, for example, could lower this size threshold. nal IS personnel were selected. That is, firms that primarily outsource one or more of the above functions are outside the scope of this study. Fifth, the selection was limited to those firms that were not exhibiting serious financial problems or turnaround situations, to ensure that any IS structure change would not be undertaken merely as an attempt to "stop the hemorrhaging" within the organization.
The resulting sample is six large (Fortune 500-type) companies, with divisionalized structural forms, paired by industry. The industry pairs include two diversified manufacturing firms, two in petrochemicals, and two in insurance. In addition, all firms in the study had implemented some IS design change within 12 months prior to our first on-site visit. 4
The study also required a set of participants from each firm who could provide data on the firm's overall and IS-related context, past and present. The managers who participated in the study are profiled according to their organizational position, by industry pair, in Table 1 . A total of 46 managers were interviewed: 24 IS managers and 22 non-IS managers.
The data collection process was an iterative one and occurred over a period of 18 months in 1991-92. For each firm there were three major phases: (1) on-site interviews, (2) a follow-up survey, and (3) report confirmation. On-site interviews were held with all of the participants cited in Table 1 . The interviews began with a sharing of the overall research framework. (Note: in place of the term antecedents, we used the terminology drivers (or enablers) for all the practitioner communications.) Open-ended questions (without researcher prompts) were then asked regarding the firm's current IS structure, relevant history, "While this could signal a bias in our study from the standpoint that all firms recently experienced IS alignment problems, the advantage for this study was that we also were able to interview participants who played a key role in a recent C/D decision and who therefore were in a position to help us identify the salient antecedents to the IS structure change. Actually, this amount of restructuring activity among the sample firms is not surprising. Henderson and Venkatraman (1992) characterize the process of coaligning the firm as "shooting at a moving target" (p.111). This echoes Thompson (1967) and Miles and Snow (1978) who note that firms--when faced with a changing environment--become part of a dynamic adaptive process that may entail frequent (or continual) adjustments throughout the firm. and the drivers for the firm's recent IS organization design change. Finally, within the interviews for the non-IS managers, prepared forms were used to measure the overall organization variables in the framework that were based on prior contingency research (see the Potential Antecedents section below and Appendix A1). In order not to bias the respondent, these characteristics were not measured until after the open-ended elicitation of the drivers. The interview data were used to plot the firm's IS structure on the C/D continuum, to initially identify a set of potential drivers for the firm's recent IS design change (including the identification of any antecedents not yet in the model), to categorize characteristics of the firm (organizational and ISspecific factors), a well as to identify specific terminology used within the firm.
Following the completion of all interviews for a given, firm, a customized survey form was prepared and administered by mail. The survey form had two purposes: (1) to serve as acom, munication vehicle for confirming the measurement of the firm's overall organizational and IS-specific factors., and (2) to capture scaled ratings of importance of the antecedents as drivers (or enablers) for each firm's recent design change. Each survey form presented the potential antecedents according to the four factors in .our framework, in the following sequence: IS Organization, IT Investment, Overall Organization, and External Environment. A page from one firm's customized survey form is presented as a sample in Appendix A2.
An extensive confidential report that profiled the firm in terms of its current IS structure, IS structure history, and the four sets of potential antecedents--based on both interview and survey data--was prepared for each firm after the surveys were returned. During this phase, the plotting of the firm's IS structure on a C/D continuum was confirmed by the primary IS contact. In addition, feedback was received on the entire content of the report, which included a final section where the findings were interpreted for that firm from a gestalt perspective. Finally, the individual case profiles prepared for this paper were also confirmed by each participating organization.
At a minimum, feedback was received from the primary IS contact in each firm. The overlapping of these three data collection phases across multiple sites was a key feature of the research design because it enabled us to incorporate insights gained from one company into the data collection and analysis of another (Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles and Huberman, 1984) . We also had the benefit of a pilot study with a firm not in the sample reported here. All three phases were completed with the pilot study, which allowed us to refine the research design and execution. The first author led all on-site interviews and handled all firm contacts.
Potential Antecedents
As introduced with the framework (Figure 1 ), the potential antecedents for a firm's IS structure are classified according to four factors. The first two are based on gestalt theory: External Environment and Overall Organization, The second two are characteristics of the IS infrastructure: IS Organization and IT Investment. For this study the scope was limited to content variables (as opposed to process variables). Table 2 is a list of all of the potential antecedents investigated in this study, organized by factor. Each antecedent has one of three sources: (1) prior contingency research, (2) other IS literature, or (3) the data collection process itself ("emergent" antecedents). In Appendix B the antecedents are presented in detail, along with their source, as described below. (The emergent antecedents are indicated with brackets in Table  2 , Appendix B, and all subsequent tables.)
The potential antecedents from prior contingency research (note 1 in Appendix B) are primarily gleaned from the classic contingency theorists, other organization theory, and strategic management literature. Each of these antecedents was measured utilizing a prepared instrument at the end of the interviews with non-IS managers. For the IS-specific antecedents identified from other IS literature prior to our data collection (note 2 in Appendix B), data was collected via openended questions rather than prestructured instrumentation. When perceptions of satisfaction with IS performance under a prior IS structure were being discussed, the participants were asked to provide a rating on a 7-point scale. After the completion of all interviews at a given site, the responses were mapped into forms organized by factor. In addition, the importance of these antecedents for a firm's recent design change was measured in the second data collection phase for each firm, whether or not the antecedent was specifically identified as an important "driver" within the open-ended interviews for that firm. That is, ratings of importance were collected for each of these antecedents via the follow-up survey. Brief definitions and historical references are provided for each of these antecedents in Appendix B.
Finally, as the study progressed, more antecedents were added to the research model based on the open-ended interviews and subsequent contacts with the case sites. These emergent antecedents (note 3) are also presented Appendix B along with a rationale for their inclusion. Because of the overlapping phases of our data collection, ratings of importance for these potential drivers were usually not collected in the follow-up survey phase for all firms in the sample.
Findings: IS Structures
C)ualitative data on the recent history of each firm's IS organization were collected during the on-site interview phase. Because of space constraints, these data are presented as minicases for each industry pair in Appendix C. First a. "snapshot" description of the overall firm and its IS structure is provided, and then the nature of the recent IS structure change for each pair is described. Table 3 summarizes the IS structures for the six firms using the tri-partite labels defined in the Methodology section (centralized, decentralized, shared) for each IS function. The IS structure changes resulting from the recent IS alignment decision in each firm are highlighted (boldface).
In four of the six firms this decision resulted in an IS design change for only a portion of the firm's business units. For such cases--that is, a "split" design for one or more IS functions--two indicators are provided in Table 3 . The original solution, which still exists for some business units, is flagged "A"; the new solution, which has affected one or more business units, is flagged "B." A narrative description of the IS structures for each pair of firms follows.
Diversified manufacturing pair
Over the past decade, D1 and D2 moved toward more extreme positions at opposite ends of the C/D continuum: D1 has become highly centralized, and D2 has become highly decentralized.
However, the recent design change at D1 was to decentralize systems development and application planning functions to a joint-venture (labeled "B"). This change was a divergence from a decade-long movement toward more centralization and was portrayed as a temporary aberration. Except at company B, the systems development and application planning functions remain highly centralized. Responsibilities for end-user computing support remain shared for all divisions: each business unit provides local support, but the central IS organization is heavily involved with technology standards, purchasing, and other support functions. All of the management of technology functions remain highly centralized, although the recent design change for the joint-venture was expected to result in the movement of mainframe applications to a minicomputer platform to be operated by the joint-venture.
In contrast, at D2 all but one of the IS functions are totally decentralized. The recent design change was to abandon an emerging corporate CIO role that had taken on some emerging technology scanning and technology planning functions. As a result, these two IS functions became totally decentralized, and the only IS function still performed by corporate IS personnel is the communications/networking function.
Petrochemicals pair
Both firms in this pair currently have elements of a hybrid IS structure, but the recent IS design changes at these firms were in opposing directions. P1 changed from a highly centralized IS structure to a "pure" hybrid IS structure. That is, the management of technology functions remain highly centralized because of both economies of scale (via consolidated platforms) and connectivity goals, while the management of the use of technology functions for all divisions has become highly decentralized. However, not all use of technology functions are totally decentralized: a central systems development staff retains responsibilities for multi-division and corporate systems, as well as standards-setting, as described for the federal government role by Zmud, et al. (1986) .
In the early 1980s, P2 also changed from a highly centralized IS structure to a hybrid one. The recent IS design change at P2, however, was the recentralization of IS responsibilities for two companies (B)--and therefore the creation of a split design. For the B companies only, responsibilities for the use of technology functions and the previously shared responsibility for the emerging technologies function were transferred from the business units to the central IS organization; for the B companies, application planning is now a shared function, and all other IS functions are now centralized.
Insurance pair
Like the petrochemicals pair, the two insurance firms currently have elements of hybrid IS structures, but the recent IS design changes at these two firms were also in opposing directions. The recent change at I1 was to partially recentralize the systems development and application planning functions. I1 now has a split solution for the systems development function because not all divisions have agreed to relinquish part of these responsibilities to the corporate IS organization. For two divisions (B) this function is now shared; for the other divisions (A) the function remains decentralized. The role of corporate IS in the application planning function has increased for all divisions, resulting in a "shared" indicator for this function in Table 3 . In contrast, 12 has changed from a highly centralized to a more hybrid IS structure for one of its two operating groups (B). 12's new IS strategy for the B companies includes a minicomputer platform and packaged software for transaction processing and reporting. Mainframe computer operations at 12 remain totally centralized, while minicomputer operations (B only) are highly decentralized. Similarly, mainframe systems development and application planning remain highly centralized. However, minicomputer systems development and application planning (B only) are shared responsibilities: the central IS organization is responsible for "core" programs of the packaged software to ensure standardization across the B companies.
Summary
Among the six firms in the sample, one firm has a highly decentralized IS structure (D2), and one firm remains highly centralized (D1)--although it recently implemented a split IS design in order to accommodate a new joint-venture. The remaining four firms have either recently adopted a hybrid structure for all divisions or an operating group (P1, 12), or have recently abandoned hybrid model (recentralized) for some divisions (P2, 11). Only two of these firms have a relatively pure IS structure (D2, P1); the other four have evolved to "split" IS structures.
The above findings provide support for the two related trends in IS alignment reported in the literature over the past decade: (1) both computer and telecommunications operations are most commonly regarded as utility functions, consolidated under a central IS unit, and (2) decentralization solutions have primarily been directed at the management of the use of technology. The above findings also support our assumption that different firms in the same industry choose different IS organization designs. However, this is a small sample, and it should be pointed out that D1 and D2 compete in different businesses within the manufacturing industry.
The existence of a split solution for one or more IS functions within a single firm has not been addressed by prior contingency researchers, but has been characterized as a desirable state in recent IS literature (e.g., Allen and Boynton, 1991) . The frequency of these split solutions in the sample highlights the importance of studying antecedents for a specific IS design change --a key feature of the research design for this study.
Findings: Antecedents
To reiterate, the core research question for this study is: what patterns of antecedents best explain different IS organization design decisions? As a first step toward developing a model of primary antecedents, each firm was profiled according to the full set of potential antecedents, utilizing both the qualitative and quantitative data collected from each firm. We then looked for patterns of antecedents to explain the four IS structures described above: highly centralized, highly decentralized, hybrid, or recentralized.
Tables 4a-c provide a summary profile of the six firms, organized by IS design choice, for the four overall organization, iS organization, IT investment, and external environment factors investigated. The emergent antecedents, for which by definition we may not have data from all six firms, are labeled with brackets. The primary antecedents for each firm's recent design change are highlighted (boldface). These were determined as follows. An average rating of importance for each antecedent was calculated from the individual ratings collected in the follow-up survey phase. Based on the interview data, we then chose a cutoff score that would capture the most salient antecedents. Those antecedents with an average rating of 5.5 or above (on 7-point scale) are highlighted for each firm. Given the profile of participants at each firm as shown earlier in Table 1 , these highlighted antecedents represent a high consensus among a firm's IS and non-IS participants.
Based on these analyses, the findings are first presented in the form of four configurations, and then are used to develo p a model of primary antecedents. Configurations #1 and #2 are derived from contrasting the two diversified manufacturing firms that have a highly decentralized (D2) and highly centralized (D1)IS structure. Configurations #3 and #4 are based on our preliminary conclusions about the nature of misalignments of the IS functions that lead to decisions to adopt, or abandon, a hybrid IS structure. A discussion of each of the four configurations, with references to Tables 4a-c, follows. The movement toward more extreme positions at opposite ends of the C/D continuum at both D1 and D2 during the past decade s can be explained as internal alignment solutions for companies with diffe'rent patterns of overall organization characteristics. As can be seen from Table 4a , D2's organization characteristics include a corporate strategy of unrelated diversification, with recent growth primarily via acquisition; a focused differentiation (niche) business strategy for each operating company; a decentralized line-of-business firm structure; and a culture that places a very strong emphasis on business unit autonomy, including an incentive system based on business unit performance only. D2's environmental and overall organization factors match well Miller's (1988) gestalt for "conglomerates," in which each of a firm's businesses varies so greatly that a multitude of management approaches, structures, and mechanisms are viable at the operating company level. The degree to which IT plays a strategic role is also viewed as variable across the business units.
Looking next at characteristics of D2's IS infrastructure, the high levels of satisfaction with the performance of the IS functions under a decentralized design are disincentives for any change from a highly autonomous mode of operation. The D2 companies also reported little opportunity for data sharing and little interest in co-ownership of applications or data center facilities. Despite the small number of IS employees in each operating company, there was no perceived need to pursue economies of scale or other synergies across business units¯ Indeed, the operating companies avoided sharing resources that might result in one company having to "play second fiddle" to another.
In summary, D2's movement toward a more decentralized IS structure over the past decade is best explained by its overall organization characteristics. The firm's recent design change was to abandon an emerging corporate CIO coorThis ignores, for the moment, the recent decentralization decision for the joint venture (B co.). dination role¯ Based on the ratings of importance from D2's participants, the most salient antecedents for this IS design choice (highlighted in Table 4a ) are related to the firm's autonomous structure and culture. The business units were unwilling to relinquish autonomy over their IS resources to a CIO. The elimination of an emerging corporate role that created friction among the autonomous business units--by placing them in a position of competing over IS resources--better aligns the firm's IS structure with the enterprise.
In contrast, D1 's overall organization characteristics include a corporate strategy of related diversification; related core businesses that compete in mature industries on cost and product differentiation; an overall firm structure that is less decentralized than D2; and a history of strong central direction and monitoring. The CIO reported taking a chameleon approach--implementing strategic planning, operational planning, and budgeting systems that "look and feel" like the operating divisions. Dl's overall posture is closest to a "defender" strategy (Miles and Snow, 1978) and a "machine bureaucracy" (Mintzberg, 1979) . There is not a widespread belief among Dl's general managers that IT plays a strategic role within the firmL ooking next at the IS infrastructure factors, there is overall satisfaction at D1 with the economies of scale and connectivity achieved under centralized responsibility for the management of technology functions. Although there is some dissatisfaction with the overall performance of the systems development (SD) function and the business knowledge of the SD personnel, D1 has achieved perceptions of local control and responsiveness by placing responsibilities for systems approval and prioritization under business unit control and annually budgets its central IS resources to match business unit requests.
As can be seen from the highlighted variables in Table 4a , Dl's recent decision to adopt a hybrid design solution for one operating company was in response to a competing set of characteristics: the operating management of a joint-venture was seeking more local autonomy and control of several centralized functions, including IS functions. At the time of this decentralization request for all systems development and application planning functions, there was also some dissatisfac-tion with the corporate IS organization's progress on systems modifications to accommodate the joint-venture--creating additional realignment pressures. The geographic proximity of the management of the joint-venture and the corporate IS organization was seen as an important enabler for the decision to relinquish some IS responsibilities to a single operating company: the new IS director of the joint-venture was unofficially included in all corporate IS director meetings.
In summary, D1 's IS goals over the past decade have emphasized efficiencies, standardized controis, and integration. Its recent IS design change was portrayed as a temporary aberration to a normally homogenous mode of operations. Its highly centralized IS structure for all but the joint-venture is well aligned with the characteristics of the enterprise, and, as an officer of the company, its CIO is in a position to initiate the necessary adjustments to maintain this alignment.
Configuration #3: Antecedents for changing from a centralized IS structure to a hybrid IS structure
Two firms recently changed from a centralized to a hybrid IS structure for more than one operating company: P1 adopted a pure hybrid structure for all divisions, while 12 adopted for its new B companies a less clearcut hybrid structure that included a change to a minicomputer platform to be operated by the B companies. Both of these hybrid choices were made in response to a mis-alignment between new overall organization characteristics and a centralized IS structure. More specifically, the data suggest that the adoption of a hybrid IS structure occurs when firms with corporate strategies of related diversification, faced with increasingly unstable environments, change their organizational gestalt. As can be seen in Table 4b , at both P1 and 12 a new CEO initiated a corporate restructuring based on a new vision for the firm that resulted in business strategies based on differentiation, more organic decision processes, and more autonomous business units (as espoused by Peters and Waterman, 1982) . 6 What cannot be seen from Table 4b , however, is that in addition to transfer-
The often cited article by LaBelle and Nyce (1987) describes similar drivers for Manufacturem Hanover Corporation, ring responsibilities for the systems development and application planning functions, both of these firms also decentralized the locus of responsibility for other corporate functions--either earlier or concurrently. (This pattern of antecedents also appears to hold true for the adoption of a hybrid IS structure by P2 under a new CEO in the early 1980s.) At both P1 and 12 there was also an emerging or shared belief in the strategic role of IT, but neither firm's participants rated this as a primary antecedent for the hybrid design decision.
A few IS infrastructure variables were rated as important antecedents for the move away from a highly centralized design for the use of technology functions. At P1 there was a perceived need to better align IS and operating company plans; the importance of this antecedent is related to the high rating for the variable Management Partnerships with IS (see overall organization factor). At 12, dissatisfaction with the systems approval/prioritization process as well as the perceived "gap" in the strategic impact of the new vs. old applications needed by the new B companies were viewed as important antecedents. The dissatisfaction with the IS budget size was linked in the interviews to mainframe computer operation costs; lower costs were anticipated under the new minicomputer platform.
In summary, for these cases the adoption of a hybrid IS structure can be explained as an action to correct a misalignment of the IS functions. Under a centralized structure there was too little business unit control over the use of technology resources in particular. At P1, IS plan deficiencies and a lack of IS/non-IS partnerships were the predominant IS-related concerns of the newly autonomous business units. At 12, the high ratings for a large number of overall organization as well as two external environmental antecedents signal the fact that IT was an enabler of 12's new corporate strategy; that is, the IS structure change at 12 was viewed as a key element of the company's new vision.
Configuration #4: Antecedents for recentralizing from a hybrid IS structure
A comparison of Tables 4b-c reveals that the two firms with recentralized IS structures (Table 4c) exhibit the same external environment of industry instability and many of the same overall organization characterstics as the two firms in Configuration #3 (see corporate strategy, business strategy, organic vs. mechanistic structuring, culture-local autonomy). However, in contrast to the firms in Configuration #3, the most salient overall organization antecedent common to the two recentralization decisions (P2, I1) is the emerging or shared belief in the strategic role of IT. Since recentralization is an action that is in conflict with the above overall organization profile, especially the strong emphasis on local autonomy, this primary antecedent (strategic IT role) appears to be an important enabler of the recentralization decision. It also partially explains the resulting split solutions for the systems development functions at these firms (see Table  3 ): some business units have relinquished systems development responsibilities, while others have retained them.
Turning to the common IS infrastructure antecedents, four variables were rated highly by the IS and non-IS managers of both recentralization firms. Two are IS organization antecedents: (1) the locus of control for systems approval and prioritization, and (2) IS plan alignment. In both firms there was dissatisfaction with the placement of the systems approval and pdodtization process totally under business unit control, and dissatisfaction with the degree of alignment among the strategic plans of the overall organization, corporate IS, and the decentralized IS units. The other two common antecedents fall under the IT investment factor: (3) the strategic application grid, and (4) the level of investment in new systems development. At both firms a large gap was perceived between the strategic impact of their existing systems vs. their systems needs for the near future, and there was dissatisfaction with the level of progress in new systems development projects--characterized as less than 20 percent at I1. The recentralization decision in both firms, therefore, is primarily due to deficiencies in IS performance capabilities under a hybrid design.
However, there were also some important differences in the recentralization decisions of these two firms. At P2, the realignment decision was initiated by the presidents of the B companies who were concerned about a lack of internal IT management expertise (an overall organization antecedent) to meet competitive environment pressures. The geographic proximity of the B companies to the central IS organization was characterized as an enabler of this design change. Further, since it was reported that the presidents of the B companies wanted to retain the option to re-absorb these functions at some future date, the partnership relationship with the CIO at P2 was also considered an important antecedent. At I1, in contrast, corporate management initiated the recentralization. In addition to the four IS infrastructure deficiencies discussed above, other characteristics related to the performance of the systems development function under the B companies--including deficient methodologies that led to "out-of-control" projects and a high total IS budget--were important antecedents. The CIO at I1, a new external hire, was perceived as the primary mover of the recentralization decision. According to the on-site interview data, the establishment of "partnerships" between the new CIO and the business unit heads was perceived to be a critical implementation mechanism.
In summary, the realignment of IS functions in both P2 and I1 stemmed from perceptions that a hybrid IS structure had failed to meet the needs of more than one operating division. By better aligning the locus of responsibility for the use of technology functions with the firm's locus of IT expertise, recentralization was expected to increase their IS performance capabilities. Under the new centralized structure at P2, the B companies can derive benefits from an expanded pool of systems development and planning expertise because of the merging of their small IS staffs with the larger, more technically experienced central systems development staff. Under a mcentralized systems development function for the B companies at I1, standardized project management controls are ensured, and performance efficiencies for the systems development function can be achieved. Further, unlike the previous IS organization decisions, the recentralization solution was viewed as a less permanent action. That is, both IS and non-IS manage{s at both firms suggested that the recentralized responsibilities could be decentralized in the future.
Model of primary antecedents
Figure 2 presents the findings across the four configurations in the form of a model of primary antecedents for IS alignment decisions in large, multi-divisional firms. The model contains a total of 10 primary antecedents, six classified under an overall organization factor and four classified under an IS infrastructure factor (a combination of the IS organization and IT investment factors in the original model in Figure 1 ).
Three of the 10 primary antecedents are composites of potential antecedents detailed in Appendix B. As defined in the footnote to Figure 2 , the antecedent Senior Management of IT captures the extent of IT management expertise among senior non-IS managers as well as three emergent antecedents (management partnerships with IS and the two readiness for IS organization change variables). The two composite "Satisfaction" antecedents under the IS infrastructure factor capture overall customer satisfaction along with other perceptions of performance found to be of primary importance for IS misalignment contexts.
In general, our findings provide strong evidence that the majority of IS structure changes are made to better align responsibilities for the IS functions with characteristics of the overall organization. First, the firms that choose highly centralized and highly decentralized IS structures (Configurations #1 and #2) have contrasting corporate strategies, overall firm structures, and cultures; widespread satisfaction with the performance of the IS functions under these opposing IS structures is achieved because of these different alignment needs. Second, the decision to change from a centralized to a hybrid IS structure (Configuration #3) can be explained as response to a misalignment created by changes in the overall organization. In our examples, a corporate restructuring (based on a new corporate vision) led to a new corporate culture characterized by strong business unit autonomy. This caused growing dissatisfaction with the performance of the use of technology functions by a centralized IS unit. At the time of the IS design change, a gap between the current and future systems needs had developed, and centralized control over systems application activities was perceived as a misalignment with the enterprise.
However, we also found that not all IS structural changes can be explained by dominant characteristics of the firm's overall organization characteristics alone (i.e., the firm's organizational gestalt). Perceived deficiencies in IS performance capabilities under a decentralized locus of responsibility can also be the source of misalignment resulting in recentralization actions.
In our examples, two firms in which. IT was perceived as playing a strategic role were lacking in the capability to deliver new applications to ensure competitiveness. This caused overall dissatisfaction with the performance of the use of technology functions under decentralized IS units. In one case the recentralization action was a corporate initiative, in the other case an operating company initiative.
The reduced set of primary antecedents for the four IS organization design decisions in Figure  2 are viewed as a step toward developing a more parsimonious model to be tested in future studies. We believe that these four patterns of primary antecedents represent commonly found configurations. However, these four profiles should be considered as representative, rather than exhaustive.
Implications for Researchers
The core research question for this study was: What patterns of antecedents best explain different IS organization design decisions? The six firms in our sample had implemented four different IS structures: (1) highly decentralized, (2) highly centralized, (3) a hybrid form with centralized management of technology and decentralized management of the use of technology, and (4) a recentralized form (that is, a return to centralization from a hybrid form). The first three of these design decisions are best explained by a set of six overall organization variables (see Figure 2) . However, the recentralization decision is best explained by perceived deficiencies in IS performance capabilities in combination with a belief in the strategic role of IT.
The prior IS literature prepared us for finding all four of the above IS structure types. However, it did not prepare us for the number of split solutions within a single firm (see Table 3 ). The implication is that research on the IS alignment topic needs to be clearly designed in terms of scope 
Figure 2. Predictive Model of Primary Antecedents for IS Alignment Decisions
and level of analysis; capturing data from a single business unit certainly is not sufficient for making assumptions about the IS structure at the level of the firm. Further, it suggests that reseamh designs that include some data collection by interview are highly desirable. Given the lack of recent research on this topic, our findings will hopefully stimulate investigations that include larger samples, firms of different sizes with other structural forms (i.e., functional, geographic, matrix), as well as more firms that have decentralized computer operations tasks as part of IT architecture downsizing decisions.
As for the findings on the antecedents for IS structure decisions, a gestalt approach that includes both overall organization and IS infrastructure antecedents appears to be well supported. Our conclusion for the external environment antecedents is that the environmental factor may be more important than the study reflects, but as an indirect determinant of IS structure. That is, environmental variables have a direct impact on the vision of the firm's top management team, which in turn influences the firm's choices of strategy, overall structure, and culture (Chandler, 1962; Miles and Snow, 1978; Miller, 1986; , as well as perhaps the extent to which a firm's management has a shared belief in the strategic role of IT for that firm. This conclusion is supported by the fact that in the two firms that rated an external environment antecedent as highly important, the IS structure change was personally championed by operating company presidents (P2) or the CEO (12).
We also found support for some, but not all, of the contingency variables from prior IS studies. As discussed in the Prior Research section, the following overall organization predictors have been proposed: industry, firm size, corporate or business level strategy, structural variables, and business unit autonomy. For our sample of large, divisionalized firms, industry type was not a strong predictor. On the other hand, we did find strong support for a contingent pattern of overall organization antecedents that include corporate strategy, overall firm structure, and business unit autonomy.
Nevertheless, the limitations of this study also need to be recognized. First, given the exploratory nature of the investigation, we chose to err in the direction of parsimony for the selection of variables (content variables only) and measures for the antecedents from prior contingency reseamh (mostly one-item, categorical). Second, the small sample of divisionalized firms also precludes us from generalizing to all large firms.
Finally, the IS structure changes found in the samPle of firms yielded significant insights only for the antecedents for decentralizing or recentralizing the systems development and application planning functions. Although this characteristic of the sample matches the trends of the past decade, we had expected to find more examples of decentralized computer operations by the end of 1991. Instead, with the important exception of 12, we found smaller computer platforms only being piloted as substitutes for business data processing on a mainframe, usually without central IS involvement.
From the review process for this article we also became familiar with an unpublished study by Feeny, et al. (1987) , discussed in Earl (1989) , tests a contingency model of five sets of independent variables (host organization, perceived IT strategic impact, external IT environment, technology assimilation, and IS heritage) and five IS organizational arrangement variables (external (IS) structure, internal structure, control systems, IS leadership, and business/IS mandate) with sample of 13 large European firms. Three of the conclusions of this earlier study appear to be especially relevant for our own. First, the Oxford researchers also reported a strong trend away from centralized toward federal (hybrid) IS structures, although they pointed to limitations in their small Sample as well. Second, they found two sets of contingent variables to be important for understanding the firm's choice of an IS structure: (1) characteristics of the host organization (defined as structure, management control systems, and culture) and (2) the firm's heritage (including perceptions of past IS success or failure under the [pre-]existing IS structure). This supports our own finding about the importance of overall structure and culture antecedents, as well as the importance of IS infrastructure antecedents that tap satisfaction with performance under a previous IS structure. Third, although operationalized differently, Feeney, et al. also conclude that their external IT environment variables did not have a direct influence on the IS organizational arrangement variables. Further, these authors distinguish between the C/D structural dimension and a specialist/user dimension, and propose relationships between the later and their remaining two sets of independent variables (perceived IT strategic impact, technology assimilation). This dimension may prove to be a useful one for future IS alignment studies.
Although this study did not directly address outsourcing decisions, the antecedents for a makeor-buy decision for one or more functions is certainly a related research topic. Loh and Venkatraman (1992) , for example, have recently proposed a model of IT outsourcing determinants that includes variables from both the organizational (business) and IT contexts of the firm. However, most of the research to date exhibits the same types of weaknesses found in the prior centralization/decentralization IS literature: the outsourcing decision is not examined within the context of the firm's IS structure as a whole, and only economic antecedents are investigated. The definitions and findings presented in this article may prove to be useful reference points for outsourcing researchers. Within our sample, for example, the manufacturing firm pursuing an unrelated diversification strategy that had a highly decentralized IS structure (D2) had business unit managers who considered outsourcing a more viable alternative than purchasing resources from a central IS unit; in this case, not only would industry-specific knowledge or specific IT expertise be perceived to be higher within an outside contract firm, but the organizational culture also discouraged actions that suggested a relinquishment of responsibilities to the corporate unit. In contrast, two division heads within a firm that had a hybrid IS structure (P2) chose to relinquish their IS resources to a central IS unit rather than pursue a contractual arrangement with an outside vendor. In both of these cases, the firm's IS structure and non-economic antecedents appear to be important for understanding a potential outsourcing decision at the business unit level.
Implications for Practitioners
The alignment of the IS organization with the enterprise has been cited as a critical management issue for both IS executives and general managers since the mid-1980s. The increasing belief in the strategic role of IT by CEOs in general (Hildebrand and Booker, 1993) , along with the level of executive manager participation in our study, suggest that the IS alignment issue will continue to be a critical one well into the 1990s.
This study was driven by a strong desire to provide empirical evidence that could form the basis for guidelines for the practitioner. Within this article evidence is provided that centralized, decentralized, hybrid, and split IS structures can be effective--but that not every IS structure is an effective choice for every firm. Further, evidence is provided that changes in IS structure can be triggered by changes in overall organization variables, even though IS performance under a current IS structure was recently perceived to be effective (see Configuration #3).
The IS executives who participated in this study were very receptive to the Gestalt approach of this study. Their reactions suggest that our overall framework for analyzing IS alignment decisions can be useful additions to the IS executive's toolkit. The trade press continues to remind us that IS design choices must make sense for the overall firm (Margolis, 1993 ). The predictive model in Figure 2 is a step toward sharing with the practitioner community our preliminary findings on "what makes sense" in terms of the key variables for IS alignment decisions.
The findings for recentralization decisions (Configuration #4) also appear to shed some light on why some firms' IS structure histories could be characterized as "pendulum swings." Further, in the two recentralization case firms, both IS and non-IS managers confided that they viewed the relinquishment of IS responsibilities by business units to the central IS unit to be an interim design change. This suggests that many recentralization solutions may be viewed at the outset as less permanent. Firms adopting such an IS solution may therefore be expected to expeditiously address the deficiencies in IS capabilities that precipitated this design change, and then begin to implement a more permanent solution---which could be a redecentralization of IS responsibilities.
Further, we share with Elam, et al. (1988) and Earl (1989) the view that effective performance of the IS functions under any IS structure also depends on the implementation of linking mechanisms beyond organization chart solutions. That is, an effective change in IS structure--whether interim or more permanent--also requires proactive implementation of three types of mechanisms: horizontal linking mechanisms (e.g., steering committees), human resource management mechanisms (e.g., crossfunctional training and development opportunities), as well as an appropriate IS leadership (CIO) role.
For example, a CIO within a firm that has adopted a hybrid IS structure--with governance of the IS functions divided between a central IS organization and autonomous business units--is operating in a much different role context than a CIO within a firm that has a highly centralized IS structure. In this study, the two firms that had recently moved from a centralized to a hybrid IS structure were defining new IS partnership roles in order to meet these new IS management needs. We also found the CIO partnership role to be an important enabler for recentralization decisions. Effective teamwork with all of the stakeholders under such IS structures has been recognized as a major challenge for IT executives in the 1990s (Benjamin and Blunt, 1992) . More research is needed to address the relationships between different IS structures and the CIO role, as well as between the other types of mechanisms. Indeed, we need to increase our knowledge about conditions under which a given mechanism change may obviate the need for an IS structure change. Appendix B
Potential Antecedents
Note: the source of the antecedent variable is designated as follows (1) Antecedents based on prior contingency research (2) IS-spedfic antecedents based on other IS literature (3) Emergent antecedents based on on-site interviews
Overall Organization
Sector/Industry (1) Significant differences exist across sectors (for-profit, not-for-profit, public) and dustries due to radically different environmental demands and ensuing strategies (Hambrick, 1984; Rumelt, 1979) . Although prior studies on the IS alignment topic have not provided empirical support for such differences (Ahituv, et al., 1989; Clark, 1992) , MIS management studies in general frequently control for these variables. Measure: controlled for by sample (for-profit sector; industry pairs).
Size (Total Employees) (1) An important causal factor in organizational studies (Kimberly, 1976) , prior studies on the IS alignment topic are explicitly recognized as applicable only for large organizations (e.g., Benjamin, et al., 1985) . There is also the potential for threshold effects: for IS organizations of a certain size, the possibility of decentralization may not be an issue. Measure: Total no. of employees in firm.
Corporate Strategy (1) Corporate strategy has been found to impact the firm's structure (Chandler, 1962; Rumelt, 1974) , the information flows across the businesses within a single firm (Miller, 1986; , and the firm's ability to achieve synergy (Porter, 1987) . Corporate strategy addresses the choice businesses the firm will compete in, including the number of businesses engaged in as well as how well those businesses fit together. Measure: single business, vertical integration, related diversification, unrelated diversification (Rumelt, 1974) .
Business S~'ategy (1) A company's business strategy influences the information needed to compete and sustain competitive advantage (Elam, et al., 1988; Miles and Snow, 1978; Porter,1980; Porter and Millar, 1985; Tavakolian, 1989) . Business level strategy addresses how the firm will compete in each of its businesses. Measure: low cost, differentiation; focus (Porter, 1980) .
Overall Firm Structure (1) A firm's structure has long been acknowledged as having a major influence over information flows and decision making within organizations (Daft, 1992; Galbraith, 1973) . The overall firm structure designates formal reporting relationships and identifies the groupings of individuals and units (Chandler, 1962; Daft, 1992; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1969; Rumelt, 1974; Thompson, 1987) . Measure:
functional, geographic, decentralized LOB, strategic business unit (SBU), matrix (Chandler, 1962; Rumelt, 1974) .
Organic vs. Mechanistic Structuring (1) The structuring of the firm in terms of organic vs. mechanistic tendencies (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Jones and Webb, 1987; Peters, 1988; Woodward, 1965) is another dimension of a firm's structure. Based on Daft (1992) , we used comprehensive definitions of the two design forms (including centralization of control, extent of rules, task specialization) as endpoints a continuum. Measure: organic and mechanistic as endpoints on 7-point scale.
Workgroup Interdependence (1) The nature of the interdependence between workgroups, or workflow, within the firm (Thompson, 1967) , is potentially important because it captures the flow of information in addition to the movement of products (materials) or service activities. Measure: long-linked, mediating, intensive (Thompson, 1967) .
Culture--Local Autonomy (1) Organizational culture is a more recently identified contingency factor that encompasses a number of dimensions (Beyer, 1981; Pettigrew, 1979) . The prior IS literature suggests that one dimension, local autonomy, can be an important antecedent LaBelle and Nyce, 1987; Sewell, 1987) . Centralized IS responsibility and control over IS resources is assumed to be a better organizational fit for firms with a centralized corporate style . Measure: emphasis on local autonomy (7-point scale).
Culture-Attitudes Toward Change (f) Organizational culture dimension based on Meyer (1982) , which captures organizational attitudes regarding change. Measure: emphasis on benefits from change (overall), product/service innovation, structural change (7-point scales)
[Method of Achieving Growth] (3) Some participants identified acquisitions or joint ventures as internal drivers toward decentralized IS solutions. Whereas joint ventures and acquisitions may result in accompanying "baggage" (such as incompatible computer systems), internally developed businesses can more easily adopt the IT platforms, methodologies, and standards already in place within the parent firm.
[Incentive System] (3) The use of incentives is a powerful tool for carrying out a plan (Thompson Strickland, 1982) . in one firm, a change in the bonus system for executives was viewed as a driver toward a decentralized IS structure, while in another firm the established incentive system was perceived as a disincentive for a more centralized change.
[New Corporate Vision] (3) A new vision/mission brings with it major changes in strategy, structure, and culture, especially if implemented by transformational leadership (Tichy and Ulrich, 1984) . In firms where a new CEO implemented a new vision, this factor was perceived by some participants as a driver for a change in IS structure that is separate from strategy, etc.
Geographic Proximity (2) The geographical spread of a firm can impact its IS structure options. For example, IS managers responsible for strategic systems development projects need to be physically close to senior line managers .
Information Intensity of Products/Services (1) The degree to which an organization is currently strategically dependent on IT to introduce new products (or services), create product differentiation, improve market access, and establish competitive advantage (Cash and McLeod, 1985) . The ways that IT strategically impacts a firm are assumed to influence the firm's IT management choices . [Note: A firm's dependence on IT to avoid competitive disadvantage was an additional measure that emerged from the interviews.] Measure: current dependence on IT to (a) introduce new products/services, (b) create product/service differentiation, (c) improve market access, (d) establish competitive vantage, (e) avoid competitive disadvantage] (7-point scales).
IT Management Expertise (2) IT management experience (steering committees, SD project teams, EUC) and IT education opportunities may result in general managers more confident in their abilities to directly manage IS resources Keen, 1991) .
IT End-User Skills (Micros) (2) Widespread end-user skills have been associated with a decrease central IS personnel for the SD function due to both the development of applications by non-IS professionals and the formal decentralization of SD responsibilities (Clark, 1992) .
Strategic Role of IT (2)
The extent to which a firm's management has a "shared belief" in the strategic role of IT for that firm could require a shift in the relationship with IS and business planning (Boynton and Zmud, 1987) . If the belief is widespread, and IT is an integral part of the firm, then all IS functions may be less likely to be centralized in a functional department (Rochester, 1989) .
[Readiness for IS Org. Change--Giver] (3) Management theorists point out that actions perceived "good" for an organization are not necessarily perceived as "good" for an individual (Robey, 1991) . The same friction exists between divisions and corporate. Our participants pointed out that the readiness/willingness of a unit to relinquish IS responsibilities can be an important "enabler."
[Readiness for IS Org. Change--Receiver] (3) Same as above.
[Management Partnerships with IS] (3) A partnership "paradigm" is becoming pervasive in the most recent IS literature (Elam, et al., 1988; Keen, 1991; Rockart 1988 ). Dixon and John (1989) point out a partnership between line and IT management is a requirement for firms in which the locus of responsibility for IT and IT use are segregated. We initially conceptualized partnerships as an organizational mechanism rather than a predictor variable. However, a partnership-based-on-trust factor (Jarillo, 1988) emerged from our interviews as a driver for changes in IS structure, separate from the two readiness antecedents above.
IS Organization
Size (Total No. of IS Employees) (2) A sizeable staff is needed for technical specialists, career paths, and risk reduction .
Structure (SD Within Central IS) (2) SD is a function that requires "bridging" in order to successfully deliver a product to a customer (McNurlin and Sprague, 1989) . Organizing the SD staff to match the business unit structure, with "client managers" for each group (Wilder, 1989) , facilitates the decentralization of "intact" SD teams at some future time.
Business Knowledge of SD Personnel (2) If a goal of decentralization is to bring IS personnel "closer to the business" (Berger, 1990) , then a perceived lack of business knowledge could be a driver to abandon a centralized IS structure for the SD function.
Locus of Control for System
Approval/Prioritization (2) A goal of decentralization is to give business units direct control over SD resources. If the authority for systems approval and prioritization is already directly held by the business units, the pressures toward decentralization could be mitigated (Von Simson, 1990 ).
IS Plan Alignment (2) New planning frameworks and processes have been introduced to more closely "couple" IS plans with goals of the organization (McNurlin and Sprague, 1989) . Perceptions of deficiencies in IS plan/business plan alignments could be a driver for change.
IS Budget Size (2) Reported in the literature as a total budget figure as well as a percentage of revenues (Carlyle, 1990a) . Perceptions of misalignment in relation to the firm's total operating expenses, or relation to competitors' IS expenditures, could be a driver for change in IS structure.
Customer Satisfaction with C&C Operations (2) Perceptions of responsiveness and competency can be influenced by load volatility, perceived need for central control over standards and operating procedures, characteristics of the chargeback system, and service level agreements (McNurlin and Sprague, 1989) . Overall Satisfaction with SD (2) Includes satisfaction with application software performance and the management of new SD requests and approved projects. Good SD performance also includes measures [Level of Investment in New SD Projects] (3) Although related to the age of major mainframe systems (IT investment) and the overall satisfaction with SD (IS organization) antecedents, the level of investment in new SD projects (vs. maintenance of existing systems) emerged from our interviews as a potential driver for change in an IS structure when deficiencies were perceived.
External Environment
Industry Stability (1) Generally operationalized as the instability of a firm's core industry (Bourgeois, 1985; Chandler, 1962; Dess and Beard, 1984; Keats and Hitt, 1988; Miller, 1986; , environmental instability often leads to changes in the firm's strategy, structure, and other firm characteristics. We initially measured instability as the volatility of sales within an industry, but the petrochemical firms in particular perceived volatility of profits as more indicative of turbulence than volatility of sales. Profits typically have not been measures of instability in the strategic management literature (Bourgeois, 1985; Keats and Hitt, 1988) . Measure: Perceived instability of industry sales [profits] over 5 years (7-point scale).
[Industry Munificence] (3) Industries are described as having a "lean" or "rich" environment in reference to the amount of funds available to firms in the industry (Dess and Beard, 1984) . Some participants suggested that slack resources resulting from a munificent environment reduced internal pressures for efficiency goals for the IS functions.
Computer & Communications Industries (2) Profound changes in C&C industries over the past decade have potential impacts for all U.S. industries. Computer architectural options enable more networked solutions because of advances in local area networks and progress in "open systems."
Computer Literacy of Workforce (2) New employees enter the workplace with microcomputer skills, and more non-IS executives are both willing and able to manage IS functions and personnel (Varga, 1989 ).
Appendix C

Mini-Cases Diversified Manufacturing Pair
D1 and D2 are diversified manufacturing companies, competing in industry environments ranging from very stable to very unstable environments. D1 has traditionally been a manufacturing firm; today more than 70 percent of its revenues are generated from its traditional, now mature industry. Its four largest operating companies are clustered in two geographic locations. D2 is a holding company of autonomous operating companies with a strategy of unrelated diversification. A cluster of three internally developed companies is geographically distant from the scattered locations of the acquired companies.
At D1 the IS functions are primarily centralized in a single IS organization of lass than 200 IS personnel that operates as an "independent business." The V.P. of IS reported taking a "chameleon" approach to designing the IS organization: its processes for strategic planning, operational planning, and budgeting intentionally "look and feel like the rest of the company"--i.e., they mirror those of the company's operating divisions. The IS V.P. is a company officer and has eight direct reports, including three directors with systems development responsibilities for three operating groups. Two of these are "site" directors, physically located within the operating companies they support; they are expected to "blend in with the customer organization," but have no dotted.line reporting relationship to the operating company. During the past decade the IS structure of D1 has evolved from having two "competing" IS organizations to becoming highly centralized: computer operations and systems development personnel previously decentralized are now part of the central IS organization. Conversely, though, D1 's most recent change in the IS structure was a decentralization action: an independent IS director position was created for a 3-year-old joint venture because of operating management pressure. This position was filled with a "handpicked" manager from the central IS organization in mid-1990, resulting in an incumbent with a "cooperative" relationship with central IS. In 1991 the joint venture became a wholly owned subsidiary, but its IS unit has not been reabsorbed.
At D2, independent IS organizations report to each operating company, usually to the respective CFO; typically, these units have only 25-40 IS personnel each. A small IS unit also reports to the controller at headquarters, but there is no central IS organization or corporate (CIO) role. All of the IS functions are totally decentralized to the operating companies with one exception: there is a company-wide telephone and voicemail system supported by a small communications unit (n = 6) at headquarters. These telecommunications responsibilities were viewed as "not needing to be" under an IS executive. The communications/networking function is therefore now highly centralized, but not totally centralized, since responsibilities for networking reside within each operating company. Within the past decade, data center resources had been shared by geographically clustered operating companies and/or corporate. Currently, however, neither production nor backup computer facilities are shared, nor are economies of scale across operating companies being sought. Instead, shared resources are currently viewed as "sources of f~iction" between companies with "competing goals"; no operating company wants to "play second fiddle" to another. In late 1990, the creation of a corporate IS role for technology scanning, large technology purchases, and coordination was considered by D2; the last IS director at headquarters had begun to perform some of these activities without a formal job description. However, the idea of a CIO role was abandoned in early 1991 due to operating company perceptions of the lack of "value added" by this position. Indeed, the CIO role appeared to some to "fly in the face" of D2's "lean" corporate staff and highly autonomous culture. The IS director position at headquarters is currently vacant and there are no plans to fill it.
Petrochemical Pair
P1 and P2 are petrochemical companies with operating companies competing in oil exploration, production, refining and marketing; chemical production and marketing; and related industries. Historically, these firms had.a corporate strategy of vertical integration. Today, however, both P1 and P2 place less emphasis on integration between their divisions; their managers classified their strategies as related diversification. Both companies have experienced the same industry shocks over the past two decades, including a recent down cycle in chemicals and a lack of external incentives for domestic oil exploration and production.
Until recently, the IS functions at P1 were highly centralized within a single IS organization under a V.P. of IS located at headquarters. The V.P. of IS had four direct reports, with one of these IS managers responsible for systems development company-wide. However, three of the systems managers and their staffs were recently decentralized to Pl's three operating companies. This action was in line with a recent corporate emphasis on "freeing up people from bureaucracy" by decentralizing "resources and responsibilities" to "where it's happening." The decentralized systems managers now have direct reports to V.P.'s within their respective operating companies and dotted-line reports to the V.P. of IS (CIO); the company-wide systems manager position was abandoned. The benefits of "living in" an operating company had already been realized: the IS managers better understood the "hot buttons" of the business, and the business managers better understood "what it takes to deliver IT." Computer and communications operations were retained by the central IS organization. In fact, the company recently had "magically" (i.e., transparently) consolidated five data centers into two in order to realize "economies of scale" for hardware and systems software, space savings, and a reduction in IS personnel.
At P2, the telecommunications and computer operations functions are also performed by a central IS organization, but the systems development and planning functions were decentralized to the operating companies as part of a corporate restructuring under a new CEO in the early 1980s. A corporate policy initiated in the mid-1980s formally delineates the responsibilities for "shared" IS services of the central IS group from operating company IS responsibilities. The decentralized IS directors have a dotted-line report to central IS. After a second restructuring in the late 1980s, two newly independent subsidiaries were expected to absorb the decentralized IS responsibilities. However, by mid-1991 both newly autonomous subsidiaries had requested that the central IS organization be primarily responsible for all of their IS functions. The presidents of the subsidiaries expressed concerns about "trailing the industry" ī n new systems development and implementation. Strategic IT applications were viewed as "essential to survival," but their executive teams lacked IS management experience; the small "inherited" IS groups had been "getting nowhere with new programs and development." Today, th.e central IS organization--which is part of a separate division with other functional services--performs essentially all the IS functions for these two companies only. The V.P. of IS for the central division "wears two hats": one as head of the central IS unit, and the other as CIO with strategic planning and coordination responsibilities.
Insurance Pair
I1 and 12 are insurance companies that underwrite and market life, health, and property and casualty insurance for individuals and groups. I1 has been operating in all of these market segments for a number of years, whereas 12 has expanded from a single-region health insurance company to a multi-region, multi-product company within the past half-decade, partially via acquisitions.
At I1 most of the IS functions have traditionally been performed by a central IS organization. However, during the 1980s, business analyst roles mushroomed within its divisions, and central systems and programming staff were decentralized to division control. By the end of 1990 several problems related to bringing systems projects "from design into production" had emerged: more than 80 percent of systems development expenditures were being "eaten up" by maintenance projects, and the analysts in the divisions were characterized as "experts on systems built 15 years ago." A new V.P. of IS brought in by early 1991 initially thought a "refocus" on the systems development function was all that would be needed. One of two major projects evaluated as "out-of-control" was put "on hold," and investments in systems methodology and tools were initiated. However, by mid-1991 the V.P. concluded that it was "time to bring [it] back together again," and a major restructuring occurred: the role of corporate IS in application planning was increased for all divisions, the systems development functions were recentralized for two divisions, and other structural changes were made to the central IS organization. The re-centralized systems functions have a perceived, but not formal, dotted-line relationship to the divisions they support. However, this recent IS design change resulted in a "split" solution for the systems development function, because not all divisions have agreed to relinquish this responsibility to the central IS organization.
At 12 all of the IS functions have traditionally been performed by a central IS organization. Under a new "visionary" CEO, a corporate "transformation" had recently resulted in a new diversification strategy and a new holding company structure with two operating groups: one group for insurance product development, and one for distribution. The central IS organization has been reassigned to the product group; a new CIO strategic planning and coordinator role has been established within corporate; and both computer operations and systems development responsibilities are being decentralized to small companies recently created within the distribution group. Each of these new companies is a "highly autonomous" profit center with a "close-to-the-customer" focus. In keeping with this new structure, a newly modified software package for a minicomputer platform is being decentralized to these companies. The new software is expected to provide the flexibility needed for "knowledge workers" to "tailor products" for "customer niches." In contrast, the mainframe software it replaces was described as a "Cadillac" system that "over-automated" processing tasks. The central IS organization has responsibility for the common "core functions" of the new software. Because of the budget independence of the small companies, one participant viewed this as "equivalent to outsourcing." The decentralized IS units are very small (approximately 5 people) and have no reporting relationship with the central IS organization "by design." 12 has therefore changed from a highly centralized to a hybrid IS structure for one of its two operating companies (B companies) as part of a corporate restructuring.
